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Fair play and fair pay: The CMA issues first ever infringement decision relating to anticompetitive collusion in labour markets

商业诉讼 | 02/05/2025

On 21 March 2025, the Competition & Markets Authority ("CMA") announced that it had made a finding of infringement against five companies active in the production and broadcasting of sports content in the UK (namely, BT, ITV, IMG, BBC and Sky) – and imposed fines totalling £4.24 million against four of these companies.1 Specifically, the CMA uncovered 15 separate instances between March 2014 and October 2021 in which the five companies had exchanged competitively sensitive information ("CSI") regarding the terms on which they would engage contractors to provide freelance services (e.g., camera operators and sound technicians) for their respective sports broadcasting activities in the UK.

 

The CSI exchanged included details about the contractors' daily remuneration rates and future pay rises. In addition, the CMA found that, in 10 of the 15 instances identified, the objectives of the infringements included coordination on pay – in effect, the five companies had been involved in wage-fixing arrangements. The CMA's full 89-page decision was made public on 17 April 2025 (non-confidential decision).

This briefing sets out some of the key takeaways from this decision.

Background


The CMA originally launched its investigation on 12 July 2022 by way of unannounced inspections at the premises of BT, IMG and ITV. This was prompted by an immunity application from Sky which had sought Type A immunity prior to the CMA launching its investigation. Sky was ultimately successful in securing a 100% reduction in the fine that would otherwise have been imposed upon it. Formal notices of investigation were subsequently issued to the BBC and Sunset & Vine Productions Limited ("S&V") on 4 April 2023. The BBC was not raided but was included in the investigation and sent an order to produce relevant documents and information. The investigation against S&V was dropped on 23 July 2024 for reasons of administrative priority. BT, IMG and ITV all approached the CMA following the launch of the investigation for leniency and were granted Type C leniency.

The CMA spent almost three years investigating the suspected misconduct between the companies active in sports broadcasting before announcing that it had reached a settlement decision with the relevant parties on 21 March 2025.2

BT received the largest fine of £1,738,453, followed by IMG that received a fine of £1,737,820; while BBC was fined £424,165 and ITV was fined £339,910 for their roles in the conspiracy.

CMA confirms that wage fixing will be treated as a "by ojbect" restriction


The most salient aspect of the decision is that the CMA has now confirmed its view that wage-fixing arrangements amount to a "by object" infringement of competition law. In practical terms, such infringements are treated as such an egregious breach of the Chapter I prohibition that the CMA is not required to demonstrate that they gave rise to any adverse effects on the relevant market(s). 

The CMA clearly noted this position in its finalised guidance on horizontal agreements3 in August 2023 but, at the time, the CMA had not yet made an official finding of infringement to this effect and stakeholders were still waiting for the first "test case" to emerge. This position was expanded upon in the CMA's Guidance to employers on how to avoid anti-competitive behaviour, where the CMA identified three main forms of anti-competitive behaviours in labour markets - namely:4

  • no-poaching agreements where competing businesses agree to refrain from approaching or hiring each other's employees outside of, say, a genuine ancillary restraint in the context of an M&A agreement;
  • wage-fixing agreements which are agreements between competitors where they agree to fix employees' remuneration/pay and other key employment benefits; and
  • other CSI exchanges relating to the broader terms and conditions that competitors offer their employees (and on which they could reasonably be expected to compete).

Conduct giving rise to the infringement


The CMA found that each of BBC, BT, IMG, ITV and Sky were important competitors on the purchase market for freelance labour for the production and/or broadcasting of sports content in the UK. Rates of pay were an important parameter in the purchase market for these relevant services. At a minimum, the objective of the sports broadcasters was to share or exchange information that removed, or at least reduced, uncertainty between the parties regarding the rates of pay, dampening competition. But in most instances, the clear intention was to fix freelancer wages. In reaching its decision, the CMA gave weight to contemporaneous documentary evidence, accounts from the individuals directly involved and witness and interview evidence. The CMA uncovered bilateral contacts through emails, phone messages, WhatsApp and calls between all the implicated broadcasters discussing freelancer pay rates.

The CMA published in its decision internal emails and other communications showing that the broadcaster employees were checking the rates that their rivals offered to certain freelancer groups, and in certain instances, agreeing to alter their rates in line with the others or agreeing to refrain from making any increase to rates.

  • There were email exchanges between senior employees at Sky and ITV where Sky alerted ITV that it would soon be increasing its crew rates of pay, and ITV agreeing that it was planning to adjust its own rates and would "follow suit" to guarantee the crews ITV needed. Otherwise, ITV feared that crews would refuse to work for it.
  • In another email exchange between employees at Sky and BT, the former indicated that although previously their company would follow Sky's lead on freelancer pay rates, on this occasion it would be "sensible" for both broadcasters to present a united front meaning that BT would increase its freelancer pay rates following Sky's decision to do so.
  • There were exchanges between IMG and BT regarding their rates of pay for an upcoming season where IMG initiated the contact and BT confirmed it would be "happy" to discuss rate information. IMG disclosed its own rates of pay and that it thought rates needed to be adjusted for the next season and requested BT's rates of pay. The objective was to ensure rates were aligned and to avoid a "bidding war" between IMG and BT.
  • An exchange between BBC and Sky revealed that they exchanged and agreed rates of pay for Christmas and New Year crew regularly - and how "cheeky" it was when BT/Timeline tried to poach Boxing Day crew by offering crew a pay bump for broadcasting on that day.
  • Similarly, in other exchanges between IMG and Sky in respect of Christmas and New Year rates, IMG had asked Sky for its crew rates over this period to ensure they were aligned with Sky and other market participants. This was to avoid paying more than necessary for the relevant freelance labour. Having obtained confirmation from Sky about its plans, IMG decided not to increase its pay rate.
  • There were other similar exchanges between BBC and BT indicating that they would not increase rates of pay if its competitors were not doing the same – "we're under pressure…to match rates…but don't want to be out of kilter and push market rates up if others aren't following suit".

Sky was the biggest producer in the industry and the other broadcasters considered that when Sky set its rates there was a ripple effect across the industry, meaning that most of the time, the broadcasters would have to follow suit or otherwise freelancers would not work for them.

The benefits of settlement and leniencey are highlighted again


The leniency and immunity programmes offered by global regulators have long had mutual benefits for both the regulator and the applicant, namely:

  • for the regulator, immunity and leniency applications provide a vital source of information gathering, without which they may not otherwise learn of certain anti-competitive activities; and
  • successful immunity or leniency applicants clearly benefit from the resulting reduction in the fines they would otherwise have received.

As mentioned, Sky successfully secured immunity and received no fines for its involvement in the infringing conduct. Each of BT, IMG and ITV were likewise able to successfully apply for leniency which resulted in discounted fines applied on a sliding scale (reflecting the order in which the entities successfully submitted evidence which provided "significant added value" to the CMA's investigation). ITV benefitted from a 42.5% reduction, whilst each of IMG and BT were able to obtain 40% and 15% reductions respectively because of their leniency applications.

Moreover, all four of the fined companies (i.e., excluding Sky) also benefited from a reduction in their overall fines by entering into settlement agreements with the CMA. Under this procedure, the companies conceded that their conduct infringed the UK's competition laws and agreed to a streamlined administrative procedure for the remainder of the investigation, in exchange for a 20% reduction in the level of their fines.

The fines could have been much higher, but the companies involved benefitted from the CMA's leniency policy and settlement procedure to secure reductions.

Parallel investigation closed due to "administrative priorities"


Separately, on 11 October 2023, the CMA launched an investigation relating to collusive conduct between entities active in the production, creation and/or broadcasting of wider television (i.e., "non-sports") content ("Parallel Investigation").5 Whether the Parallel Investigation was prompted by evidence reviewed by the CMA into the CSI exchanges for sports broadcasting – where ITV and the BBC were parties to both investigations6 – is unclear, but this seems plausible.

Interestingly, the CMA made a concurrent announcement on 21 March 2025 that it was closing its Parallel Investigation, citing administrative priority grounds. The CMA's official case closure statement is available here.

The CMA noted that, having considered the information it had gathered in this case and the additional time/resources required to continue the Parallel Investigation, it had decided that the continued scrutiny was no longer warranted under its Prioritisation Principles.7 Indeed, the CMA expressed the view that, in this case, "a more proportionate way" of addressing the issues identified was to "draw the [p]arties’ attention" to the competition law concerns identified and the CMA's relevant guidance documents addressing anti-competitive arrangements in labour markets. Importantly, whilst this action from the CMA does not preclude it from taking any future enforcement action, it is likely that – unless future evidence emerges which suggests that the parties involved have continued to engage in the conduct which was originally investigated – the CMA will not be minded pursuing further action in this particular case.

The CMA's decision to close the Parallel Investigation may also have been prompted by the UK Government's recent Strategic Steer, in which the CMA has been encouraged to pursue its statutory function more proportionately (in the Government's view), which will include prioritising cases which demonstrate the most serious harms to UK businesses and consumers, as well as resolving cases within swifter timeframes. Perhaps the infringement decision against the five companies involved with sports broadcasting was considered a sufficient deterrent against similar conduct in other areas of broadcasting to enable the CMA to pursue other cases on its roster.

Increased regulatory focus on labour markets across jurisdictions


The CMA is not the only regulator willing to take enforcement action against companies for anti-competitive conduct in labour markets. Many global antitrust regulators have already begun clamping down on anti-competitive agreements/arrangements between competitors in the employment context, making it clear that ensuring labour markets are competitive is key. Just as companies need to procure inputs to conduct their activities, so too do companies need employees with the requisite qualifications and experience (and must compete with each other to procure the best talent).

The European Commission ("EC") has made clear that both wage-fixing and no-poach agreements are likely to infringe Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU") "by object" and are akin to buyer cartels.8 Whilst, the EC has yet to make a first formal infringement decision regarding labour market agreements, it formally initiated its first no-poach investigation in July 2024 in the online food delivery sector, and in November 2024 announced that it had conducted dawn raids in the data centre construction sector over possible no-poach collusion. The Head of the EU's Cartel Unit also signalled last year that labour markets would be a key area of focus going forwards by taking the rare step of issuing a policy brief on how it will analyse wage-fixing and no-poach agreements.9 Moreover, national competition authorities have set down their own precedents with a number of decisions over the years, including:

  • In 2016, the Bundeskartellamt fined three broadcasting companies for exchanging CSI, which included sensitive employee information (such as holiday pay rates).
  • In 2021, the Lithuanian Competition Council held that the Lithuanian Basketball League and ten national basketball teams had colluded in order to avoid paying basketball players after the playing season in 2019/2020 ended early in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.10 In a very similar case, the Polish Competition Authority announced in October 2022 that it had issued fines against the Polish Basketball League and 16 member clubs for jointly agreeing to terminate the contracts held with basketball players during the COVID-struck 2019/2020 season.
  • In 2022, the Greek Hellenic Competition Authority found that the Association of Elevator Maintainers and Installers of Northern Greece had engaged in anti-competitive wage-fixing activity by setting minimum renumeration levels for elevator installers and maintainers.
  • In 2024, the Belgian Competition Authority found that three private security companies had participated in serious cartel practices, which consisted of price fixing, bid rigging and no-poach agreements.11
  • More recently, in 2025, the Romanian Competition Authority announced that it had launched an investigation into suspected anticompetitive practices in the dental services market, including agreements to impose a minimum wage level and no-poach obligations regarding the recruitment of dentists from different practices.12
  • Across the Atlantic, the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") has taken a strict approach against no-poach and wage-fixing arrangements since 2016. However, although the DOJ has persuaded several courts that no-poach agreements are antitrust violations, the DOJ has not been very successful in persuading juries that these agreements are "criminal" antitrust violations. Nonetheless, the DOJ has indicated that it intends to enforce no-poach and wage-fixing agreements criminally and that it will not be deterred by its string of setbacks. On the other hand, the U.S. has been successful in the civil context, where substantial damages claims have been brought against entities for labour market infringements. In 2024, multiple red meat processing companies settled a wage-fixing claim brought by a class of workers for $200.2 million.13 One of the defendants alone paid $29.75 million in settlement.

A warning for uk businesses


The CMA's first labour market infringement decision serves as a warning to UK businesses that they must not engage in any kind of anti-competitive behaviour, and that such activity within labour markets is no exception. The CMA will take robust enforcement action against wage-fixing agreements and any other practices that harm competition and workers. Freelancers and employees should be able to negotiate pay freely and move jobs without interference from coordinated employer actions which reduces employee pay, terms and choice as well as free movement of labour.

Companies need to ensure that their HR teams and employees fully understand how competition law applies to labour markets. Companies should update their competition compliance policies and roll-out training, specifically for human resources staff, on the application of competition law to their activities. Similarly, businesses should review and solidify their internal reporting processes to enable early detection of any potentially problematic conduct. Companies should be aware of the following:

  • Wage-fixing: Competitors must not agree on the level of employee wages and other remuneration, nor any other key benefits that might mark a parameter of competition between different employers. Instead, businesses should set any internal employment remuneration and benefits policies independently to avoid any risk of collusion.
  • No-poach agreements: Companies should not agree with their competitors not to approach or hire each other's employees.
  • Information sharing: While gathering market intelligence through public channels is permissible, companies (and employees) must not request or receive CSI from competitors: any sharing of recent, current and future information is particularly problematic. Additionally, whilst companies can conduct some types of benchmarking exercises, it is imperative that sufficient safeguards are put in place. These include: (i) using an independent third party; (ii) keeping a written benchmarking work plan; and (iii) ensuring the data is sufficiently aggregated, anonymised and historic.

The CMA's message is clear: wage-fixing, no-poach agreements and exchange of labour related CSI between competitors are viewed as seriously as price fixing in relation to goods or services and will be penalised accordingly.

  

1 The decision was addressed to the following entities: (i) the British Broadcasting Corporation ("BBC"); (ii) BT Group plc ("BT"); (iii) IMG Media Limited (including its current and previous parent company (together, "IMG"); (iv) ITV Broadcasting Limited and its parent company ITV plc (together "ITV"); and Sky UK Limited and its previous parent company (together, "Sky").

3 The Competition & Markets Authority. Guidance on the application of the Chapter I prohibition in the Competition Act 1998 to horizontal agreements. August 2023. Para 6.9(a). Available at: Guidance on horizontal agreements

4 See CMA, Employers Advice on how to avoid anti-competitive behaviour.

6 In full, the parties involved in this investigation were: (i) BB; (ii) Hartswood Films; (iii) Hat Trick Productions; (iv) ITV; (v) Red Planet Pictures; (vi) Sister Pictures; and (vii) Tiger Aspect Productions.

7 See CMA, Employers Advice on how to avoid anti-competitive behaviour.

8 The European Commission. Competition Policy Brief. May 2024. Available at: adb27d8b-3dd8-4202-958d-198cf0740ce3_en

13 See the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlements. Available at: Brown v JBS 2024-09-06 Motion dckt 369_0.pdf

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