Beyond screening: FCA sets out its expectations for effective sanctions controls
The FCA's proposed changes to its Financial Crime Guide substantially expand its guidance on sanctions risk and controls
The proposals reinforce the expectation that firms should understand how they may be exposed to sanctions through customers, counterparties, intermediaries, jurisdictions, goods, services, transactions and payments. Put simply, financial and trade sanctions need to be considered together and firms need to have systems and controls in place which recognise and account for this. The proposals also recognise the distinct roles of OFSI, OTSI, HMRC and the FCA.
As we noted in our recent article on the Consultation, the proposed amendments do not impose new requirements. But they provide considerably more detail about what the FCA considers effective financial crime systems and controls should look like in practice.
Governance: sanctions are a senior management issue
New FCG 7.2A.2 states that senior management should take "clear responsibility" for managing sanctions risk, with evidence that they are actively engaged and that identified gaps are remediated.
The self-assessment questions are revealing. Firms are asked who owns sanctions compliance, how performance is monitored, how senior management is kept informed, whether issues are escalated and whether there is appropriate oversight and understanding where controls rely on external resources.
Management information receives similar attention. The FCA expects regular and ad hoc Management Information ("MI") to give senior management a clear understanding of sanctions risk, including metrics on alerts, true matches, suspected breaches and even how quickly screening systems are updated.
The key message is familiar: firms need to demonstrate ownership, understanding and effective oversight of sanctions controls, not just the existence of sanctions controls.
Risk assessment: looking beyond designated names
A perhaps more significant development is the breadth of the proposed risk assessment guidance.
The FCA asks firms to consider circumvention, intermediary countries, sectoral and trade sanctions, enablers acting for designated persons, and exposure created by products, jurisdictions and counterparties. For firms involved in international trade, the FCA identifies as good practice mapping clients' products and industries against sanctioned goods and sectors.
That is important because sanctions exposure extends beyond identifying a designated name. That broader perspective reflects the issues increasingly seen in sanctions case law and enforcement action, where sanctions risk can arise through underlying trade flows, ownership and control structures and attempts to circumvent restrictions, rather than simply through direct dealings with a designated person.
Screening: understand the tool, not just its output
The proposed Guide devotes substantial attention to the mechanics of screening: list management, data quality, calibration, fuzzy matching, testing, alert management and resourcing.
Where third-party tools are used, firms should understand how they are calibrated and when lists are updated. The FCA identifies as poor practice having "limited or no understanding" of those matters, while good practice includes testing configuration and recording key decisions around lists, suppression rules and fuzzy-matching thresholds.
Those expectations have a clear enforcement read-across. Recent OFSI cases have exposed apparently basic weaknesses in screening, including failures involving name variations and transliterations, ownership information and sanctions-list data.1
The recurring regulatory message is that firms may use third-party screening technology or group resources, but this does not absolve them of responsibility for their own sanctions compliance. Firms need appropriate governance and oversight of third-party arrangements and cannot assume that reliance on a provider will insulate them from the consequences of deficiencies in their sanctions controls.
Evasion: screening alone will not identify circumvention
New FCG 7.2A.11 expressly confirms that simple name screening may not identify sanctions evasion and that alternative detection techniques may be needed.
Good practice includes data analytics, thematic reviews of exposure to high-risk circumvention countries and sectors, tailored transaction-monitoring scenarios, vessel and IP tracking and controls addressing wire stripping.
This reflects the changing nature of sanctions risk. Controls need to identify not only who a firm is dealing with, but also what is happening around the transaction.
Practical takeaways
The FCA's proposed changes to the Financial Crime Guide represent a detailed and useful benchmark against which firms can test their sanctions frameworks. They should also be considered against the backdrop of recent enforcement action, including the FCA's £29 million Starling Bank case2 and OFSI's £4.73 million Citibank penalty.3
Firms may therefore wish to use the consultation to revisit governance and MI, sanctions risk assessments, ownership and control, trade-sanctions exposure, third-party screening arrangements, calibration and testing, alert backlogs, circumvention detection, and escalation and reporting procedures.
The FCA is signalling that sanctions compliance is not simply about whether a name generates a hit. The regulatory focus is increasingly on whether the systems and controls surrounding that screening are capable of identifying, understanding and responding to the sanctions risks firms actually face.
1 See, for example, OFSI, Imposition of Monetary Penalty – Bank of Scotland Plc (January 2026); and Imposition of Monetary Penalty – Citibank, N.A., London Branch (September 2026).
2 https://www.stephensonharwood.com/insights/starling-bank-fined-29-million-for-financial-crime-systems-and-controls-failings/
3 Imposition of Monetary Penalty – Citibank, N.A., London Branch - GOV.UK