Licence to run: unpacking the draft Great British Railways licence

Licence to run: unpacking the draft Great British Railways licence

Rail & Road | 18/11/2026

The eagerly awaited consultation on the draft Great British Railways (“GBR”) operating licence (the “Consultation”) was published by the Department for Transport (“DfT”) on Thursday 12 November.

Following on from the policy framework published in May 2026, the Consultation sets out the first full illustrative text of the single integrated licence under which GBR will legally operate Britain’s rail infrastructure and publicly owned passenger services when it assumes operational responsibility. Lord Peter Hendy has recently expressed an aspiration for the Railways Bill – currently in the House of Lords – to become an Act of Parliament before the end of this year, which means GBR is likely to be established towards the end of 2027.

For the first time since privatisation, the licensing regime is being built for an integrated public sector body rather than a fragmented private market. Under the current Railways Act 1993 framework, operators hold separate licences for distinct railway assets. The licensing regime is intended to ensure that all railway operators are playing by the same rules, as well as ensuring they comply with a number of requirements in the public interest.

The proposed GBR licence consolidates authorisation for the mainline network, stations, passenger trains and light maintenance depots into a single instrument granted by the Secretary of State under section 7B of the Railways Act 1993 (as amended by the Railways Bill). For those familiar with the existing forms of licences, there will be some familiarity with elements of the draft GBR licence. The draft GBR licence will have an impact on existing licences already held by other stakeholders, and the Office of Rail and Road (the “ORR”) has recently consulted on what changes may be required to those existing licences to ensure alignment with GBR.

The Consultation runs until 21 January 2027, ahead of a formal statutory notification procedure later in 2027. So what is in the draft licence, what has notably been left out and what are the key takeaways for industry participants, third-party investors and devolved authorities? Stephenson Harwood’s Rail and Road team has taken a look at the draft licence considers the core structure of the licence, the shift in regulatory oversight and what this means in practice.

You can find the full consultation at the government’s website here.
   

A STREAMLINED LICENCE FOR A “SINGLE DIRECTING MIND”

By its nature, any regulatory licence for a public-sector monopoly requires a careful balancing act: empowering GBR to act as the “single directing mind” for the railway without day-to-day ministerial interference, while ensuring robust accountability to passengers, freight customers, third-party operators and taxpayers.

To achieve this, the DfT has adopted a deliberately streamlined, outcomes-focused approach rather than treating the licence as an operating manual. This is similar to the approach which the ORR currently adopts for licences which it issues for the national network, although there has definitely been significant streamlining of what GBR will be required to do. Indeed, the Consultation acknowledges that the DfT does not want GBR to be subject to what it calls “disproportionate regulatory burden” and allow GBR to manage the inevitable trade-offs which will be needed. The substantive conditions are grouped into four thematic parts:

  • Part A – Information Requirements: GBR must provide the ORR with information reasonably and proportionately required for its functions under a jointly agreed reporting framework. The ORR also retains the power to require GBR to appoint Independent Reporters for specialist external assurance.

  • Part B – Passenger Experience: a new Passenger Watchdog (legally the Passengers’ Council already contemplated in existing legislation) will take over setting minimum consumer standards – initially adopting the ORR’s existing rules on delay compensation, complaints handling, passenger information and accessible travel. The requirement to ensure that cross-industry arrangements to enable passengers to make seamless journeys involving more than one operator – reflective of a function currently undertaken by the Rail Delivery Group – is also expressly set out in the draft GBR licence. Under the Railways Bill the ORR will retain enforcement responsibility via the licence, and it will be interesting to see if this split of responsibilities will make for a different approach to enforcement: the Consultation makes clear that ORR enforcement should be a “last resort”. The Consultation notes that GBR will also be bound by wider obligations, including compliance with Accessible Station Design Standards, the Rail Passengers’ Rights and Obligations Regulations, National Rail Conditions of Travel, Rail Ombudsman membership and sharing real-time train movement data across the network.

  • Part C – Stewardship and Governance: this section governs GBR’s system wide responsibilities, including long-term asset stewardship, administering cross-industry through-ticketing and revenue settlement (functions transferring from the Rail Delivery Group), a new land disposal regime, compliance with an ORR-managed Retail Code of Practice, stakeholder engagement and facilitating third-party investment. Interestingly, the draft GBR licence expressly requires GBR to have regard to the Long Term Rail Strategy currently under development and the funding outcomes from each periodic Funding Review in undertaking its long-term stewardship obligations.

  • Part D – Shared Industry Obligations: to preserve cohesion across a mixed-traffic railway, GBR must remain a member of the Rail Safety and Standards Board and the Claims Allocation and Handling Agreement, maintain an Environmental Policy covering climate adaptation and resilience, grant emergency access to stations and depots, and keep an up-to-date schedule of operated sites.

It is worth noting that while “non-GBR” operators (including freight, open-access and devolved operators) are outside the scope of the Consultation, the ORR consulted over the summer on consequential changes to their licences. We are awaiting the outcome of that consultation. How cleanly those two licensing regimes align will be critical for third-party operators.
  

WHAT HAS BEEN LEFT OUT AND WHY IT MATTERS

Perhaps the most revealing part of the Consultation is Table 1, which catalogues over 20 familiar conditions from Network Rail’s current licences and ORR model licences that are omitted from the GBR draft.

In many cases, omissions claim to reflect GBR’s public-sector status and the wider statutory architecture of the Railways Bill. Provisions on sufficient resources, financial ring-fencing, cross-subsidy, corporate governance and network management duties are not included in the new GBR licence on the basis that they are now governed by statute, Managing Public Money, GBR’s Business Plan or the bilateral DfT-GBR Framework Agreement. Of course, the simple point remains that by removing such requirements from the licence, it means that they will not be enforceable by the independent regulator, which could have an impact on accountability. Similarly, the payment of licence fees to the ORR is dropped because the Railways Bill empowers the ORR to fund itself via a statutory levy on GBR.

However, one omission will attract particular scrutiny from private-sector operators and commercial counterparties: there is no standalone non-discrimination condition. Network Rail’s current network, station and depot licences prohibit undue discrimination between operators. This is highly concerning. The DfT argues this is unnecessary for GBR because it will already be bound by public law principles (fairness and impartiality), competition law and its statutory duties, as well as the Access and Use Policy (and you can find our thoughts on the draft Access and Use Policy here). We suspect some scepticism will understandably remain among freight and open-access operators, who will rely on GBR both as infrastructure manager but whom will also be a competitor to many. A key question will be whether judicial review and competition law – and the judicial review standard in the context of the Access and Use Policy – will offer as swift or accessible a remedy as direct regulatory enforcement by the ORR. We doubt it will.
  

WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR INDUSTRY AND INVESTMENT…AND WILL IT WORK?

On its face, a streamlined, 25-year minimum term licence (terminable thereafter on 10 years’ notice, absent revocation) offers welcome long-term stability and sets GBR up for success. Yet several commercial and regulatory shifts will need to be worked through carefully before GBR stands up towards the end of 2027:

  • ORR’s shift from pre-approval to procedural audit: across several key areas, most notably land disposal, long-term asset stewardship and stakeholder engagement – the ORR’s role shifts from approving operational decisions upfront to auditing whether GBR has complied with its own published policies. It is often easier to break the rules and seek forgiveness than comply with the rules in the first place, and we worry that this approach will simply encourage rule-breaking. For example, under Condition 8 of the draft GBR licence, GBR will no longer need ORR consent to dispose of railway land. Instead, GBR will publish a Land Disposal Policy. While affected stakeholders can refer disputed disposals to the ORR (which freezes the disposal pending review), the ORR will only assess whether GBR followed its policy; the ORR will not substitute its own commercial judgement. Furthermore, once land is transferred to GBR’s brownfield regeneration subsidiary, Platform4, subsequent disposals or developments by Platform4 fall outside the licence condition altogether. For developers and local authorities, this makes influencing the initial drafting of GBR’s Land Disposal Policy paramount. One of the issues we have raised previously is, seemingly, the lack of checks and balances against what GBR may do in the reformed railway. This makes us no less concerned, and in the case of land disposal, provides for a relatively easy way to circumvent the restrictions in the licence. Indeed, the Consultation states “The role of ORR should not be to second-guess GBR’s operational decisions.” and this theme seems to permeate the approach adopted to the draft GBR licence.

  • Third party infrastructure investment: Condition 11 requires GBR to publish transparent, accessible arrangements (such as guidance and template contracts) to facilitate third-party investment in stations, depots and capacity enhancements, building on the current Rail Network Investment Framework. While the ORR will monitor whether GBR’s general framework is fit for purpose, the ORR will not intervene in individual commercial decisions. Private funders and Mayoral Strategic Authorities will therefore want clear dispute-resolution and governance mechanisms built into those template arrangements.

  • Group structure and subsidiary ring-fencing: GBR will operate as a parent company with operational subsidiaries. Subsidiaries will not hold separate licences. Condition 1 requires GBR to maintain a list of “Relevant Subsidiaries” and procure their compliance, keeping regulatory enforcement risk at parent level.

  • Retail market neutrality: as GBR will simultaneously operate as a ticket retailer and administer cross-industry ticketing and revenue settlement systems (Condition 7), independent ticket retailers will look closely at Condition 9, which mandates compliance with the ORR’s forthcoming Retail Code of Practice. Ensuring genuine separation of decision-making in practice will be essential to maintaining market confidence.
      

NEXT STEPS

The draft GBR licence marks a decisive step away from the privatisation model toward a unified, outcomes-based, regime. By consolidating permissions and stripping out prescriptive rules, the government aims to give GBR the operational headroom to manage track and train as a single system. This is a positive aspiration, particularly in a world where GBR is envisaged to be able to direct, and take steps to deliver the operational railway for the end-customer. However, the streamlined approach to the GBR licence, as well as the way that the licence has been drafted, suggests that regulatory intervention will be minimal, and the concern about there being a lack of checks and balances on GBR’s power remains. We would also expect devolved bodies to want to see something in the draft licence about how GBR will work with them, and whether GBR must have regard to local priorities in undertaking its functions.

Much of the practical detail is deferred to secondary policies – including GBR’s Land Disposal Policy, Stakeholder Engagement Policy, Third-Party Investment Framework and the ORR’s Retail Code of Practice, all of which are intended to be in place by Autumn 2027. Stakeholders will need to remain aware that these policies are forthcoming and ensure they contribute into their development to ensure GBR is set up in a way that will work for the whole industry.

In relation to the Consultation, industry stakeholders have until 21 January 2027 to respond to the 12 consultation questions. We suspect there will be significant interest in feeding into the development of the GBR licence, particularly around safeguards and the intersection between the commercial interests of freight and open access operators and GBR’s monopoly functions.

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