Last month, Lebanon marked in grief the fifth anniversary of a tragedy that struck the heart of the nation's capital. At 6:08 pm on 4 August 2020, over 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate, which had been improperly stored at the Port of Beirut, detonated, causing one of the largest non-nuclear explosions in history. The disaster killed no less than 218 people, injured and displaced thousands more and caused material destruction estimated in the tens of billions of dollars.
Whilst the investigation into the disaster is ongoing, some information has come to light, albeit limited (and still alleged):
In 2013, the Moldovan flagged cargo ship Rhosus, made an unscheduled stop in Beirut after experiencing technical problems. The vessel, which was transporting ammonium nitrate from Georgia to Mozambique, was detained by Lebanese port authorities for failing to comply with safety regulations. The ship was declared unseaworthy and subsequently abandoned by its owners. The highly explosive cargo was thereafter offloaded and stored in a warehouse at the Port of Beirut, where it remained for over six years, until that fateful early evening on 4 August 2020.
While these facts wait to find their place, among other evidence, within the long-awaited indictment being compiled by Judge Tarek Bitar, the prosecutor tasked with the criminal case, they may already help shed a light at another aspect of this tragedy, and a wider issue in the shipping industry: the current safety standards governing the transportation and storage of dangerous goods.
As the impact of this disaster extended well beyond Lebanon’s borders, serving as a powerful reminder of the catastrophic risks posed by the mismanagement of hazardous materials, this article looks at whether it may have also prompted the global community to re-examine the international regulations and standards relating to port safety, the transportation and storage of dangerous goods, and the effectiveness of such regulations.
Lebanon has been a signatory to the International Maritime Dangerous Goods ("IMDG") Code and various conventions under the International Maritime Organization ("IMO") long before the disaster.
The IMO is a UN agency responsible for establishing global standards for the safety and security of international shipping. Additionally, the IMO oversees the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Safety Management (ISM) Code. Together, the IMDG Code, SOLAS and ISM Code set out requirements for maritime safety and the safe carriage of dangerous goods by sea.
The core issue exposed by the Beirut disaster was not the absence of legal norms. The explosion cast a harsh spotlight on the global disconnect between international frameworks and their actual enforcement within domestic jurisdictions. It became clear that ratification alone is insufficient, and governments must actively implement these for the standards to have real impact.
Following the disaster, the European Union (“EU”) took a proactive role in examining its implications for maritime safety and the management of hazardous substances. Recognising that many EU ports also handle significant volumes of dangerous goods, the UN convened a high-level seminar in late 2020 regarding 'Lessons from the Beirut Explosion.'
Although a range of instruments already govern the storage, handling, and transport of dangerous substances, the seminar highlighted the urgent need for stronger enforcement at national levels. The focus was reviewing existing systems and identifying areas for improvement, particularly regarding regulatory gaps, implementation, and vulnerabilities such as reliance on paper-based customs data, which can lead to lost or misclassified high-risk shipments.
The seminar emphasised that port safety depends on coordinated action between stakeholders, including port authorities, customs, civil defence, and others. A recurring theme was the absence of a unified digital platform for real-time high-risk shipment data, hindering effective risk-management.
In 2021, the International Cargo Handling Coordination Association published a Warehousing White Paper focused on the storage and handling of dangerous goods. This quickly became a cornerstone of post-Beirut discussions, offering an assessment of the regulatory landscape and highlighting shortfalls in implementation.
A key finding was that whilst the IMDG Code is updated biennially, it remains focused on the maritime leg of transport. The Code offers little guidance on how hazardous cargo should be stored on land. Additionally, there is no true equivalent to the IMDG Code that comprehensively governs the labelling, segregation, and managing of dangerous goods when stored. Instead, national and local building codes are often looked at to bridge the gap.
Interpretation and selective enforcement also pose challenges. The IMDG Code is highly technical and complex, leaving room for ambiguity. The Paper noted that some governments “cherry-pick” which parts of the Code to follow or use special provisions to justify non-compliance.
Most alarmingly, the Paper revealed concerns in emergency preparedness. Many ports, including some located near densely populated urban areas, have not conducted emergency drills for decades. The report noted that only five maritime nations had flagged any recent non-compliance with dangerous goods protocols, suggesting that inspection regimes remain inconsistent and often superficial.
Overall, the Paper bolstered the stances adopted during the UN/OECD seminar and stressed the need for a more cohesive and enforceable global framework for the safe storage of dangerous goods, both at sea and on land.
Recently, the IMO updated the IMDG Code to clarify that that ammonium nitrate and related fertilizers may only be stowed under deck if all hatches can be opened in an emergency, ensuring effective firefighting and ventilation. Whilst this does not directly address land storage, it demonstrates the international community’s ongoing commitment to safer practices.
Furthermore, a Dangerous Goods Safety Task Force was established to draft EU-wide safety guidelines and collect port data, with a focus on high-risk substances. The EU is further developing a centralised digital tracking system for customs, port authorities, and emergency services, alongside new risk-based inspection regimes.
While there is increasing emphasis on accurate and timely cargo declarations and a shift toward digitalised cargo manifest systems to enhance traceability, the integration of these systems could bolster risk management.
The Beirut explosion stands as a glaring example that the mere existence of international conventions and standards is not enough. For many governments, ratifying treaties remained the first and only step, without sufficient emphasis on domestic legislation, regular inspections, and training. The responses, however, reflect a growing recognition that real safety requires more than formal compliance. It demands a culture of vigilance, accountability, and continuous improvement. The lessons of Beirut are clear: without commitment, even the most comprehensive regulations shall remain ineffective.
