Transboundary nuclear liability in ASEAN: Bridging the liability gap - Nucleus edition

Transboundary nuclear liability in ASEAN: Bridging the liability gap - Nucleus edition

Nuclear | 17/11/2026

This article was published in our nuclear briefing, Nucleus.

ASEAN stands at a critical juncture in its energy policy. Faced with surging electricity demand, a growing population of around 700 million, and ambitious decarbonisation commitments, several member states have announced nuclear energy programmes.

Modern nuclear reactor designs incorporate safety features intended to reduce the likelihood and consequences of severe accidents. Some designs, including certain Gen III+ reactors and certain small modular reactors, use passive systems to reduce reliance on external power or operator intervention. These features require design and site-specific assessment and do not eliminate accident risk; estimated accident frequencies are not observed accident rates. A clear and comprehensive compensation framework to address nuclear accidents is essential for sound risk management and to support public confidence in nuclear development as a pathway to a cleaner energy future.

Against that backdrop, the absence of a transboundary nuclear liability framework within ASEAN is a significant regulatory gap. Only the Philippines is party to an international nuclear liability convention (the Vienna Convention), and the relevant domestic law remains outdated. There is therefore no uniform treaty‑based route to compensation across ASEAN; cross-border claims may nevertheless be covered, depending on the applicable convention and domestic law.

This liability gap weakens effective victim protection, undermines the bankability of nuclear projects, and makes public acceptance, already sensitive after accidents such as Fukushima, significantly harder to secure.
  

International nuclear liability conventions

Because nuclear accidents can be low‑probability but catastrophic, with long‑lasting environmental and health impacts and complex causation issues, ordinary tort law is often inadequate. Low estimated probabilities do not justify disregarding extreme external hazards, common-cause failures or events affecting several units. To deal with this, two parallel international conventions emerged: (i) the Paris Convention (1960), adopted under the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), the OECD’s predecessor, and (ii) the Vienna Convention (1963), adopted under the IAEA. The Paris Convention mainly serves European states, while the Vienna Convention was designed to create a truly international instrument open to all states.

Despite different institutional origins, both the Paris and Vienna regimes are built on similar core principles. They impose strict liability on nuclear operators, so victims need not prove fault. Subject to limited exceptions and rights of recourse, they channel third‑party liability for nuclear damage covered by the relevant convention to the operator, generally shielding suppliers and contractors from direct claims and simplifying insurance arrangements. Operators are required to maintain financial security, such as insurance or other guarantees, to fund covered claims within the applicable limits. Jurisdiction over claims is exclusive to the courts of the installation state, limiting forum shopping. Compensation must be available without discrimination based on nationality or residence, but liability amounts are capped at defined ceilings and claims must be brought within prescribed periods. These principles aim to collectively balance victim protection, legal certainty for operators, and the facilitation of nuclear energy development.

Subsequent updates (the 1997 Protocol to the Vienna Convention and the 2004 Protocol to the Paris Convention) raised minimum liability amounts, broadened the definition of nuclear damage to include economic and environmental loss and preventive measures, and in the Paris regime’s case extended limitation periods and allowed for unlimited operator liability. The Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention (Joint Protocol) was also adopted to allow victims in a Vienna Convention state to claim under the Paris Convention for an incident in a Paris Convention state and vice versa.

However, uptake of these protocols has been limited and geographically concentrated, and major nuclear states such as the US, China, Japan and India remain outside the Paris/Vienna framework.

Recognising that the Joint Protocol could not achieve universal coverage, the IAEA developed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), adopted in 1997 and in force since 2015, to provide a more globally inclusive mechanism. The CSC is open to parties to the Paris and Vienna Conventions and to states that are party to neither, provided their national legislation meets specified minimum standards. The CSC also created an international supplementary fund financed by contributions from contracting states, weighted by installed nuclear capacity. At least half of the international fund must be reserved for transboundary damage. The CSC also explicitly permits regional arrangements consistent with its framework, offering a legal foundation for ASEAN to build regional mechanisms atop a global system. A 2026 amendment further improves the CSC’s attractiveness by removing capacity‑based contribution requirements for states with no nuclear reactors, making accession more appealing for states such as Singapore or Thailand.

Globally, the nuclear liability landscape is multi‑layered rather than unified, but CSC now covers the largest number of operational reactors under any single instrument, including reactors in states such as Japan and India that are not party to the Paris or Vienna Conventions.
   

National nuclear liability laws

Many nuclear‑operating countries that remain outside these conventions have domestic nuclear liability laws that reflect similar core principles, including strict operator liability, caps and mandatory financial security. Japan’s handling of compensation under national law after the 2011 Fukushima accident, before it joined the CSC in 2015, illustrates the role of national compensation regimes and state financial support. Nonetheless, international treaties remain important because they provide predictable jurisdictional rules, agreed mechanisms for legal channelling, and better prospects for cross‑border enforcement of judgments. Without treaty relations, victims may pursue claims in multiple jurisdictions, and suppliers and investors face fragmented litigation risk, as illustrated by Fukushima‑related lawsuits in US courts, where the absence of a nuclear liability treaty between the US and Japan left US courts unconstrained by Japanese jurisdiction and channelling rules.
  

ASEAN’s nuclear liability landscape

No ASEAN member state currently operates any power-generating nuclear power plant. Nevertheless, several states have adopted domestic nuclear liability regimes incorporating internationally accepted principles, creating a foundation for future regional harmonisation.

These states are the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia, though only the Philippines and Vietnam address transboundary nuclear incidents. Please see the table below for further details.

Philippines

Vietnam

Malaysia

Indonesia

Key legislation on liability

Republic Act No. 5207 (RA 5207), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1484

Law on Atomic Energy No. 94/2025/QH15

Atomic Energy Licensing Act 1984, as amended by the Atomic Energy Licensing (Amendment) Act 2025

Law No. 10 of 1997 on Nuclear Energy

International nuclear liability Conventions

1. Party to the Vienna Convention, but not the 1997 Vienna Protocol
  

2. Signed but not ratified the CSC

Not a party to any international nuclear liability convention

Not a party to any international nuclear liability convention

Signed but not ratified the Vienna Convention and the CSC

Liability regime

RA 5207, aligned with the Vienna Convention, remains the governing instrument for liability
  
A proposed Philippine Nuclear Liability Act to modernise these provisions in line with the 1997 Vienna Protocol remains pending before Congress

Operators must obtain insurance or financial guarantees; any state support for excess liability is subject to the applicable statutory conditions
  
Compensation limits depend on applicable domestic law and any international treaties binding on Vietnam

The Director-General may adjust liability limit, subject to a floor of RM 12 million (approximately $2.7 million). This floor is well below international benchmarks

Strict operator liability capped at approximately $93 million - a relatively low cap

Transboundary liability provisions

Yes

Yes

Not addressed in the legislation

Not addressed in the legislation

 
A harmonised ASEAN approach

Against this backdrop, a harmonised ASEAN approach is needed. In the near term, ASEAN member states with nuclear power programmes should align their domestic legislation to CSC standards and accede to the CSC.

Operationalising a nuclear liability regime, however, cannot be a purely national exercise. Because the effects of a nuclear accident can be cross-border, member states must co-operate on practical aspects such as transboundary claims handling and the mutual recognition of compensation awards. They also need to agree regional approaches on matters that the convention leaves to national laws, including the extent of compensation for non-core heads of damage and causation standards.

Experience from Fukushima, for which some estimates of total accident-related costs, including decommissioning and decontamination, not just victim compensation, have exceeded $200 billion, suggests ASEAN should consider whether it can generate compensation amounts substantially above current treaty minima. Options include establishing a regional nuclear insurance pool that aggregates the limited capacity of domestic insurers, using governments as reinsurers of last resort, and creating an additional fund financed by supply‑chain participants, drawing by analogy on the reactor-operator-funded supplementary tier of the US Price‑Anderson arrangements or the oil receiver‑funded mechanisms used for marine oil pollution.

ASEAN’s nuclear liability regime should also reflect the technologies the region is likely to deploy. Much of the anticipated build‑out involves small modular reactors (SMRs), as well as innovations such as nuclear‑powered ships and transportable nuclear plants, which raise liability questions not fully addressed in existing conventions. ASEAN should participate actively in international discussions on SMR liability and ensure its regional framework confronts these issues directly.

The region already has relevant institutional infrastructure: the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM), which links national nuclear regulators, and the Nuclear Energy Cooperation Sub-Sector Network (NEC-SSN). This work is, moreover, already embedded in the region's energy blueprint, the ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation 2026-2030, which commits to developing policies on nuclear liability and exploring financing and insurance mechanisms for nuclear programmes.

Regional cooperation has proved vital in other contexts, such as the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) in Europe and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiatives in the Gulf, and ASEAN could usefully survey these experiences.

Encouragingly, momentum is building. The IAEA has been actively promoting accession to the CSC as a pathway towards a global nuclear liability regime, and ASEAN states appear increasingly receptive. In December 2025, the IAEA co-organised a workshop in Bangkok - mirroring one held in Europe that October - which brought together representatives from six member states (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam) to deepen their understanding of the CSC.
   

Challenges to a harmonised ASEAN approach

These foundations notwithstanding, the path to a regional liability framework faces real obstacles. ASEAN operates on a consensus-based model grounded in non-interference and respect for sovereignty, which makes binding, cost-bearing commitments harder to achieve than the prohibitory commitment embodied in the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (known as the Bangkok Treaty), under which all ASEAN member states have agreed to ban nuclear weapons throughout the region. A nuclear liability regime asks states not merely to refrain from conduct but to accept affirmative financial obligations and cross-border exposure. Further, many states hold the view that national nuclear programmes are matters of national sovereignty.

Member states are also at markedly different stages of nuclear development - Vietnam and the Philippines have advanced programmes, while others remain in early exploration - so their appetite for assuming liability commitments varies widely. Disparities in regulatory capacity, legal infrastructure, and trained personnel further complicate harmonisation, particularly for less-developed member states still building the "bare minimum" of nuclear governance.
 

The need for a credible transboundary nuclear liability regime

Features intended to improve safety in modern reactor designs do not eliminate accident risk or the need for comprehensive compensation arrangements, even where assessed accident probabilities are low. Nevertheless, ASEAN currently has no coherent framework to address cross‑border nuclear damage. Existing domestic laws are uneven, compensation limits are often far below international benchmarks, and only one member state presently participates in any international liability convention. At the same time, the international regime itself is fragmented, with multiple overlapping instruments and major nuclear states outside the core conventions.

ASEAN needs to bridge this liability gap. While political, institutional, and capacity constraints are real, a credible transboundary nuclear liability regime is not optional. It is a precondition for protecting victims, enabling investment, and securing public confidence in ASEAN’s nuclear future.

Share Article

Related Expertise