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UK fatalities at sea: Coroner’s Court, crisis response, and lessons for owners, charterers and operators in high-risk regions
In light of the recent escalation of conflict in the Middle East, the risks facing vessels, owners, charterers, crew, and personnel providers operating in the region have increased dramatically. Whilst we anticipate stakeholders are already reviewing and updating procedures to reduce the risks to vessels and crew, it is equally important to understand the legal and operational consequences if a UK crewmember is tragically killed at sea following an attack or incident.
This article focuses specifically on the English and Welsh legal framework and provides practical guidance and key considerations for management and operations teams—highlighting how best to prepare and what to expect, should their vessel be targeted in a hostile incident involving a UK national.
A UK Coroner’s Court in England and Wales has jurisdiction to investigate the death of a UK citizen occurring outside the United Kingdom, where the body is subsequently repatriated to the Court’s jurisdiction. Even if the body is not recovered, there may still be an investigation into the death. Subject to jurisdiction, a coroner is under a duty to investigate where there is reason to suspect that the death was violent or unnatural or where the cause of death is unknown. Therefore, if you have UK citizens onboard and a fatality occurs due to a war risk, there is a likelihood that a coroner will open an independent inquest into the death of that individual.
Step one: The importance of a thorough and dynamic risk assessment cannot be overstated
The risk profile for any particular vessel will vary depending on a number of factors, including the vessel’s location, flag state, ownership, operator nationality, intended destination, and cargo.
Relevant intelligence and guidance are available from a variety of sources, including:
- industry guidance documents such as Best Management Practices (BMP) for Maritime Security
- intelligence provided by commercial maritime risk management companies
- the Joint War Committee (JWC) circulars
- the Maritime Industry Security Threat Overview (MISTO); and
- live operational updates from organisations such as UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) and the Maritime Security Centre – Indian Ocean (MSCIO)
Operators can develop internal risk hierarchies or scoring frameworks to identify which vessels and voyages present the greatest exposure to assist with their assessments.
It is essential for operators to have a clear understanding of what information is available—whether publicly accessible or obtained through private channels—and to ensure that this intelligence is actively analysed and incorporated into their current risk assessments. Regularly updating risk assessments with the latest data and insights is critical for maintaining an accurate picture of evolving threats and for making informed operational decisions. Given the events unfolding in the Middle East, the frequency of such reviews could be daily. Failing to do so can leave vessels and crews exposed to risks that could otherwise have been anticipated and mitigated and the Coroner will assess whether or not an opportunity was missed.
Step two: Risk management plans should be tailored to the specific vessel and voyage
Generic policies are unlikely to be sufficient in a rapidly evolving threat environment. The UK Department for Transport has recently issued guidance on countering drone threats to shipping, but such threats evolve quickly and response strategies should therefore be reviewed regularly.
Possible measures may include enhanced vessel affiliation checks, selective management of AIS transmission, differential routing through higher-risk areas, and—where appropriate—the use of additional physical security measures such as onboard security personnel.
The threat posed by drones and unmanned surface vessels (USVs) is now well established. It is of course self-evident that the defensive capabilities available to naval vessels are not available to merchant shipping, however, operational planning can still play a role in reducing exposure. For example, careful consideration may be given to crew accommodation and operational arrangements in order to minimise the presence of personnel in areas of the vessel that are more likely to be targeted in an attack.
It is essential that onshore personnel and vessel managers ensure that all risk management plans and updates are not only communicated but also received, understood, and implemented onboard. Given the demands on crew, it is easy for updates to be missed or documentation to go unread. Operations teams must ensure that critical information relayed to the vessel is acknowledged and acted upon. Maintaining checks and records of this process is invaluable in the event of an incident, as it provides clarity on who knew what, and when.
Furthermore, the following steps will also be useful:
Comprehensive Briefings and Training
Vessel owners and operators should ensure that the Master and crew are provided with the latest safety advice and information, including BMP considerations, emergency response procedures, security and voyage planning, checklists, and flag state requirements. Crew should not only be briefed, but should also participate in regular drills to build competency and experience in reacting to safety and security threats and records of these drills should be kept.
Equipment Maintenance
Ship security equipment must be maintained in a properly calibrated state at all times, in line with manufacturer requirements and industry best practice.
Vigilance Despite Past Trends
The absence of recent or historical incidents does not mean danger is absent. Masters and crew must remain vigilant, especially when transiting high-risk areas. Decision making around rotations, watch systems and any changes should be discussed with all stakeholders involved in managing the safety of the vessel (onshore and offshore) and decisions recorded accordingly.
Step three: In the event of an incident, strike or fatality, an internal crisis response structure is essential
In the minutes and hours following an incident, significant volumes of information will flow to and from the vessel. On a commercial vessel, multiple personnel may be reporting simultaneously to a range of stakeholders, including vessel owners, operators, managers, insurers, security contractors, and external organisations such as UKMTO.
Effective response—both during the immediate crisis phase and in the period that follows—will depend heavily on establishing an accurate timeline of events. In practice, this can be challenging, particularly where key stakeholders are operating across different time zones. Operators should therefore consider in advance the systems that will be used to collect, store, and organise information in the aftermath of an incident, ensuring that it can be used effectively to support operational response, regulatory reporting, and any subsequent investigation.
Minor incidents should be addressed with the same thorough record-keeping and reporting procedures as major incidents. Accurate and detailed reporting is crucial for obtaining advice from authorities such as UKMTO or the vessel owner’s company/ship manager. Frequently, what may have been deemed minor and unimportant at the time, could later have been a key indication or useful information. This can only occur if the information recording is accurate and transmitted to all of the relevant stakeholders in a timely fashion.
Major Incident Response
- Preserve detailed records of vessel operations up to the incident and produce new records promptly. Take witness statements from the master, crew, and SSO as soon as reasonably possible, balancing this with immediate safety and emergency response needs.
- Notify all relevant parties, including the Company Security Officer (CSO), Designated Person Ashore (DPA), UKMTO, contracted security company, flag state, and any other relevant authorities.
- The use of the citadel should be carefully considered and only used if it does not place the crew in greater danger.
- Ensure clear communication of orders from the master throughout the chain of command.
- Consider requesting support from trauma teams, security forces, or naval escorts before resuming the voyage, if advised.
In response to major incidents, parties frequently form a Crisis Management Team (CMT) ashore to effectively manage the incident away from the hostile situation onboard. The CMT is usually formed by the vessel owner or operator who may decide to include other stakeholders as they deem necessary. Care should always be taken to limit the members of the CMT to those whose presence is essential, and have strict procedures in place to manage what information is shared externally and when. Table top exercises should be performed to ensure the CMT are prepared for such incidents.
Company Security Officer
Under the ISPS Code, every shipping company is required to appoint a CSO, who takes care of the ship’s security. The role of the CSO in respect of managing the steps referred to above cannot be underestimated. The CSO is responsible for ensuring that the appropriate security measures are implemented in accordance with the Ship Security Plan, monitoring potential threats and supporting the ship’s crew in maintaining a secure operating environment. After a major incident, the CSO’s primary role is to coordinate between the suitably qualified Ship Security Officer (SSO) and the owners/operators, ensuring the Ship Security Plan is reviewed and updated to prevent future incidents.
The CSO therefore holds a critical role and should ensure that they are made aware of all threats and possible incidents in order to continually reassess the risk management plans and provide assistance to the ship’s crew from ashore.
Conclusion
Given the range, accuracy, and ready availability of drones and USVs, the unfortunate reality is that some risks to vessels and crew cannot be fully eliminated. In such circumstances, any inquest is likely to focus less on attributing responsibility for the attack itself and more on the adequacy of the risk assessment, risk management, and mitigation measures adopted by those responsible for the vessel’s operation. The practical steps outlined above should be implemented with this reality in mind.
In practice, the hostile party or parties responsible for such attacks may never be definitively identified, even where plausible working assumptions can be made about their origin. This underscores the importance of demonstrating robust, proactive safety and security procedures—not only to protect those on board, but also to satisfy the scrutiny of any subsequent investigation or inquest.
At an Inquest, the scope of investigation is likely to centre upon risk management practices and the identification of factors that contributed to the incident. The Court will likely hear evidence from a range of relevant witnesses, including those who were present at the scene of the incident as well as those who can speak to industry safety protocols and risk management strategies. Witnesses may include crew members, representatives from shipping companies, maritime risk management operatives, and officials from bodies such as the Department for Transport (DFT). At the end of an Inquest, the Court will reach factual findings and deliver a conclusion. Further, a Coroner has a statutory duty, should the relevant pre-conditions be met, to make a prevention of future death report (PFD). The PFD reporting power serves an important public health function. A Coroner’s Court does not determine any issues of civil or criminal liability.
This article is co-authored by Cathal Leigh-Doyle, Partner at Stephenson Harwood, Elgan Rees Williams, Managing Associate at Stephenson Harwood and Rory Holmes, a Barrister at Crown Office Chambers. They have worked together on a high-profile marine coroner investigation involving UK personnel.
Stephenson Harwood have considerable experience advising in the aftermath of serious maritime incidents, including those involving hostile acts and fatalities at sea involving USVs and drones.
Editors: Leon Domladis and Conor Warde
