This article was published in our nuclear briefing, Nucleus.
In November last year, we published an article surveying the state of nuclear power across ASEAN. Since then, several significant developments have emerged against a backdrop of heightened energy security concerns, looming decarbonisation deadlines and surging electricity demand. In this article, we track those developments and assess where the region now stands.
Last month, Singapore announced that it will, in early 2027, undergo the Phase 1 Mission of the Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) – an assessment by the UN atomic watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to determine whether the country is ready to make an informed decision on nuclear deployment.
In parallel, Singapore has intensified international cooperation to build its technical and operational capabilities, particularly in small nuclear reactors (SMRs). In March this year, the Government signed a memorandum of understanding with Korea’s state-owned Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co Ltd (KHNP) to cooperate on nuclear energy development with a focus on SMRs. In June, it entered into a memorandum of understanding with the UK Office for Nuclear Regulation to exchange safety-related regulatory information across the full nuclear lifecycle, including regulatory considerations around new reactor technologies like SMRs, and to train scientific and technical personnel.
Singapore’s methodological, regulator-first approach to nuclear is consistent with how it has historically moved on other complex infrastructure and power market reforms. While it has not yet committed to deployment, once Singapore reaches an “informed decision”, we expect international nuclear vendors to take a close interest as the Government has shown that it can move quickly on project execution once policy alignment is achieved.
Vietnam has been the most active mover in the region since the start of 2026. In our previous article, we highlighted Vietnam’s plans –unveiled in April 2025 – to build two nuclear power plants, Ninh Thuan 1 and 2, targeting commercial operation between 2030 and 2035 and providing 4,000-6,400 MW of baseload capacity. To facilitate this, Vietnam passed the Law on Atomic Energy in June 2025, which took effect in January this year.
Vietnam has since pressed ahead with concrete project agreements. In March this year, Vietnam and Russia signed an intergovernmental agreement for the construction of Ninh Thuan 1, laying the legal foundation for Vietnam’s first nuclear power plant. The plant is planned around two Russian-designed pressurised water reactors built by Russian state-owned Rosatom. Deputy Prime Minister Bui Thanh Son attended the launch of the population relocation, resettlement, and site-clearance project for the plant in Khanh Hoa Province, underscoring that implementation is already underway on the ground, not just on paper.
The following month, Vietnam signed a four-party memorandum of understanding to explore Korean financing for Ninh Thuan 2, bringing together three Korean state-owned entities – Export-Import Bank of Korea (Korea Eximbank), the Korea Trade Insurance Corporation (K-Sure) and Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) – alongside Vietnam’s state-owned PetroVietnam. The plant had been left without a partner after Japan formally withdrew in December 2025, citing the tight construction timeline, but the speed with which Vietnam moved to engage a new partner suggests a clear determination to keep both projects on track and to diversify its strategic partnerships beyond a single nuclear supplier.
Vietnam is currently the only ASEAN country to have undergone an INIR Phase 2 Mission. In December 2025, the IAEA conducted the Phase 2 Mission of Vietnam's nuclear programme and a report was delivered to the Government in April 2026. Under IAEA policy, INIR mission reports are published on the agency’s website 90 days after delivery to the member state, unless that member state requests otherwise in writing. Vietnam’s report is not currently publicly available.
The Philippines remains in the institution-building phase of its nuclear programme and the Government continues to actively create the regulatory conditions and licensing architecture to attract investors, including from the private sector. The Government in February this year finalised a “harmonised, whole-of-government licensing and permitting flowchart” covering nuclear power plant projects end-to-end, with sequential and parallel approvals designed so that developers, vendors and financiers can plan around predictable timelines. This follows the enactment of the PhilATOM Law in September 2025, which established PhilATOM as the country's first independent, quasi-judicial nuclear regulator; and the Department of Energy's Circular in October 2025, which sets the policy foundations for the country's first commercially developed and operated nuclear power plant. This matters because procedural ambiguity has bogged down discussions in the region. It also sets the stage for the Philippines to begin formally accepting nuclear power plant licence applications by the end of 2026.
The Philippines also continues to attract interest from major nuclear powers. In February this year, the US Trade and Development Agency committed $2.7 million to help Meralco PowerGen, a subsidiary of Manila Electric Company (Meralco), the Philippines' largest private electric distribution utility, evaluate US SMR designs and develop an implementation roadmap. The following month, during a state visit by South Korean President Lee Jae-myung to Manila, KHNP, Korea Eximbank, and Meralco signed a tripartite memorandum of understanding to cooperate on nuclear power plant development in the Philippines, covering technology cooperation, human resources development, site selection, and financial support.
The Philippines is also leveraging its broader regional influence. It takes the ASEAN chairmanship in 2026 and hosted the World Nuclear Supply Chain Conference in Manila last month, positioning itself as a regional convening point for the sector. The Philippines has also secured a seat on the IAEA Board of Governors for 2025–2027, strengthening its role in shaping global nuclear safety and security policy.
The emergence of a clear, bankability‑focused framework for nuclear, combined with strong US and Korean engagement, is likely to draw increasing attention from SMR vendors and investors. Whether targets can be met will turn on how efficiently it can translate this institutional groundwork into site selection, permitting and long‑lead procurement over the next few years.
Indonesia is intensifying bilateral discussions with Russia, the US, Japan, Korea and others while it lays the institutional and legislative groundwork for nuclear development. In our previous article, we highlighted US company ThorCon's proposal to build a nuclear plant through private investment, and the site evaluation approval granted by the Government in August 2025. No new material developments have been publicly disclosed but there are reports that the project is facing scrutiny: ThorCon’s molten-salt reactor technology remains at the prototype stage, and so its timeline to commercial operation carries execution risk.
Once Indonesia clarifies its institutional model and its legislative and regulatory framework, its status as Southeast Asia’s largest power market and electricity consumer is likely to make it one of the most attractive jurisdictions for international nuclear companies.
Malaysia is one of four ASEAN countries, alongside Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia, that have formally announced plans to pursue nuclear energy. It has been steadily strengthening its legislative framework for nuclear development. On 1 December 2025, Malaysia amended its nuclear regulatory framework to require permits for all atomic energy activities, including the import, export and transhipment of radioactive materials. The amendments also introduced mandatory decommissioning plans as a precondition for building facilities, alongside new requirements for nuclear material accounting and control systems, IAEA inspections, and reporting obligations.
Thailand remains the most measured of the ASEAN core movers. Nuclear power has been included in its national power development plan, but the plan remains in draft form and no finalisation date has been announced. No material developments have been publicly disclosed since November last year.
In August 2025, Laos and Russia signed a nuclear energy cooperation roadmap that could lead to plans for the country’s first nuclear power plant. Myanmar inked a similar cooperation agreement with Russia in March 2025 to build a 110 MW SMR (as covered in our previous article) with no institutional and regulatory infrastructure, though no material developments have been publicly disclosed since. Cambodia's latest national energy strategy signalled an openness to nuclear, and Brunei has told the IAEA it is "carefully exploring" the option.
The region's nuclear turn is part of a larger wave across Asia. Last month, Russia agreed to build Kazakhstan's first nuclear power plant in a US$16.5 billion deal, with Moscow financing roughly 85% through a state export loan. The model mirrors Vietnam’s: the same VVER-1200 reactor technology bundled with the credit to build it. Russia’s traction in Kazakhstan, Vietnam, Myanmar and Laos illustrates how its ability to offer turnkey, heavily financed packages that shift cost‑overrun and delivery risk away from host governments gives it a clear early advantage. This is especially true in countries that lack deep nuclear experience and have limited fiscal space for a first‑of‑a‑kind national asset. Russia has also shown a willingness to move quickly from political agreement to binding project documentation where strategic relationships are already strong. For governments facing acute capacity shortfalls or energy security pressures, this ability to compress timelines can be decisive. For other ASEAN states, while these features are compelling, they also embed long-term strategic and dependency considerations, which host governments will need to weigh against purely economic benefits. It is also notable that, like Vietnam, Kazakhstan is seeking to diversify its strategic partnerships by turning to a different supplier (China, in Kazakhstan’s case) for its second nuclear power plant.
While Russia’s influence is most visible through its export‑finance model, China remains by far the world's most active builder. According to the World Nuclear Association, around 39 reactors with a combined 41,074 MW of nuclear capacity are under construction — more than any other country. On the technology front, in April, India’s prototype 500 MW fast breeder reactor, a type of advanced nuclear reactor that uses less uranium to generate electricity, reached “first criticality”, achieving a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction. Once the reactor becomes operational, India will be the second country after Russia with a commercial fast breeder reactor. India has also moved decisively on the policy front. December 2025 brought the landmark SHANTI Act, opening the sector to private and foreign investment for the first time, in service of a 100 GW target by 2047.
Japan, by contrast, is reviving an existing fleet. In February this year, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) restarted Unit 6 (1,356 MW) of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant, the world's largest nuclear plant by potential capacity, and the utility's first reactor back in service since the 2011 Fukushima accident, with the unit reaching commercial operation in April. The restart brought Japan's operating fleet to 15 reactors with another 18 operable but not yet restarted. New Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has signalled a faster nuclear revival to reduce reliance on imported fuel, in line with a national target for nuclear to supply around 20% of electricity by 2040.
As shown above, several significant developments have emerged across ASEAN since late 2025 against the wider Asian build-out. Vietnam has gone furthest, with a signed intergovernmental agreement for Ninh Thuan 1 that gives its programme tangible momentum. The Philippines leads on institutional and regulatory maturity, with an independent nuclear regulator to support a commercial nuclear programme and a formal investment incentive framework in place. Whether the 2032 target for the first plant holds will depend heavily on how quickly site selection and licensing proceed from here. Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand sit further back, focused on policy frameworks, feasibility work, and capability-building, though any of them could move quickly once a decision is made.
The other defining feature of nuclear power across ASEAN is that its nuclear future is being shaped as much in Moscow, Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo as in Hanoi or Manila, which makes vendor choice a geopolitical decision as much as an energy one.
