The UK Government’s new consultation on whistleblowing - proposals to financially reward economic crime whistleblowers

Regulatory & Investigations | 22/10/2026

The UK Government recently published a consultation on whether the whistleblowing regime established through the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (“PIDA”) should be revised and updated. PIDA amended the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”) to protect workers who report wrongdoing from dismissal and other forms of retaliation by their employer. This second article considers the consultation’s proposals for a scheme to financially reward economic crime whistleblowers.

The Serious Fraud Office (“SFO”) is developing proposals for a scheme (“the Scheme”) that would reward people who provide them with information about economic crime (“economic crime whistleblowers”). The aim is to encourage more people to come forward with information, strengthening the SFO’s ability to investigate and prosecute serious fraud, bribery and corruption.

In Jonathan Fisher KC’s Independent Review of Disclosure and Fraud Offences published in July 2026 (the “Fisher Review”), he recommended that the government legislate to allow the SFO to introduce such a Scheme. Fisher recommended that there should be a consultation on the detailed design of the Scheme.

The consultation indicates that the government supports the introduction of an SFO whistleblower incentivisation scheme and is seeking views on the detail in its consultation.

There are existing whistleblower incentivisation schemes in the United States and Canada, and evidence suggests¹ that they increase the quantity and quality of reporting of corporate misconduct, such as fraud, bribery and money laundering. Those offences can be difficult to detect because they are often complex and hidden.

Most whistleblower reward schemes operate by paying whistleblowers a percentage of the funds recovered as a result of the information provided. They typically specify a reward range, often between 10% and 30%. Some impose a cap on the value of rewards such as the Ontario Securities Commission’s scheme (CAD $5 million) whereas others such as the US’s Securities and Exchange Commission’s do not.

In the UK, HMRC has recently launched its Strengthened Reward Scheme for individuals who report serious tax avoidance or evasion whereby an individual whose information leads to the collection of at least £1.5 million in tax may receive a reward of up to 30% of the tax collected, excluding penalties and interest. Although payments remain discretionary, there is no cap on the size of the reward.

The Fisher Review recommended that new criminal offences be introduced:-

for individuals who knowingly make false reports under the Scheme. The person will not commit of this offence if he does not know or suspect the report or evidence submitted to be false.
for those who harass or intimidate whistleblowers to the Scheme.

The Fisher Review also recommended the establishment of an independent arbitration panel to review appeals or complaints made by whistleblowers to the Scheme. It identified a number of further issues that should be considered when designing the Scheme including:-

how the size of a whistleblower’s reward is determined.
the type of individual eligible for reward.
guardrails to minimise abuse of the Scheme.
the interplay between whistleblower incentivisation and corporate self-reporting policy.

Government’s preferred approach and key areas for consultation

The SFO is proposing to introduce an incentivisation scheme that would reward economic crime whistleblowers where that information leads to a corporate conviction or alternative enforcement action. The government proposes that, to qualify for a reward, information provided by a whistleblower must be both significant and original and must lead to a successful enforcement outcome against a company, such as a criminal conviction or a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (“DPA”).

Any reward would be funded from a proportion of the financial penalty or fine paid by the company. As a result, rewards would only be paid once a case has concluded successfully and all appeal rights have been exhausted.

The consultation seeks views on whether the SFO should be responsible for determining both eligibility for rewards and the amount or should leave these decisions to the courts or another body. It also seeks views on the Fisher Review’s recommendation to establish an Independent Arbitration Panel to consider appeals and complaints relating to the operation of the Scheme.

The government recognises the importance of transparency and is therefore also considering whether the SFO should be required to publish an annual report on the Scheme,

Eligibility for rewards

Given the objectives of the Scheme, the government does not propose to link eligibility under the Scheme to the requirements of making a protected whistleblowing disclosure under the ERA. For example, individuals would not need to be classified as “workers” under the ERA to qualify for a reward under the Scheme. Instead, the government envisages establishing a separate set of criteria tailored to the Scheme’s objectives. Factors that could be considered include whether an individual:

has a legal duty to report the information;
was culpable in the offending their disclosure relates to;
has a serious criminal conviction;
is an authorised “Covert Human Intelligence Source”²; or
has obtained the information through dishonest means.

The government suggests that consideration is given to whether whistleblowers who originally report information to another UK or overseas authority, which then passed it to the SFO, should be eligible for reward.

If the government proceeds with this approach, it says it will engage with a representative group of stakeholders to develop and refine the eligibility criteria.

Determining the size of a reward

The government suggests that rewards should be calculated as a percentage of the financial penalty or fine imposed on a company. A specified percentage range would be set, with the exact reward determined according to a range of factors.

They say these factors could include the value of the information to the case, the whistleblower’s level of cooperation, how promptly the information was reported, any complicity in the criminality being reported, and the relative significance against other information that contributed to the enforcement outcome. The government also suggests that, where a number of individuals provide different pieces of qualifying information that contribute to a successful enforcement outcome, the total value of the reward could be shared between those whistleblowers.

In addition, the consultation seeks views on whether the Scheme should align with most existing whistleblower incentivisation schemes and not impose a cap on the maximum value of rewards.

Offences to support a whistleblower incentivisation Scheme

The consultation seeks views on whether the new criminal offences proposed by the Fisher Review should be introduced for individuals who knowingly make false reports under the Scheme.

The consultation also seeks views on the Fisher Review’s recommendation to create a criminal offence for harassing or intimidating whistleblowers who report information under the Scheme. In particular, the government wishes to understand whether this would provide meaningful protection for individuals who report information to the SFO but are not covered by the protections under the ERA, or whether existing civil and criminal offences (such as the common harassment offence) already provide sufficient safeguards.

The consultation states that if the government decides to particular proposals pursue either of these criminal offences, it will engage with a representative group of stakeholders to support their development and ensure they are appropriately designed.

Final thoughts

The proposals may give rise to a degree of unease. It may be considered unattractive that whistleblowers need to be financially incentivised, as the prospect of a potentially substantial reward should arguably not be necessary for individuals to report serious criminal conduct. In addition, where a case may turn on a whistleblower’s own evidence, questions arise as to how the potential incentive should be taken into account and whether that evidence should be treated with additional caution.

¹ The Inside Track: The Role of Financial Rewards for Whistleblowers in the Fight Against Economic Crime. Eliza Lockhart. December 2024. The Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) research programme. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/63e4aef3ae07ad445eed03b5/t/6756cfd024f33859fb718888/1786383097130/SOC-ACE-RP31_Whistleblowing-Dec%2B24.pdf
² As defined in S. 26(8) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.

Author - David Capps